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Abstract: 
In the past 25 years, the "war on drugs" has continued despite evidence that it has not been 
successful. One aspect of this war, civil asset forfeiture, has been used as a tool by federal, state, and 
local law enforcement to "take the profit out of the drug trade" and to increase the amount of revenues 
that law enforcement may use to carry out the "war on drugs." The purpose of this research note is to 
examine federal and state studies to ascertain how proceeds from for features are used by the 
respective governments. It was determined that a vast majority of states (88 percent) as well as the 
federal government explicitly allow law enforcement agencies to benefit from the "war on drugs" by 
keeping the proceeds from civil asset forfeitures. Likewise, only a small number of states (fewer than 
20 percent) mention treatment or education as beneficiaries of proceeds, even though it has been 
argued that treatment and education may be more successful in reducing drug-related crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this research note is to outline how states and the federal government may utilize 
the proceeds from civil asset forfeiture. This is done by providing an examination of the relevant 
state and federal laws that authorize the use of forfeiture proceeds. This note builds on the work of 
Kessler (1999), who provided analyses of state and federal forfeiture statutes and examined a number 
of jurisdictions in depth, and offers a more critical assessment of the use of civil asset forfeiture in the 
''war on drugs." 
 
In general terms, there are two types of forfeitures. The first type, criminal forfeiture (also called 
in personam forfeiture), is employed after a criminal conviction has been garnered.  In effect, the 
forfeiture is deemed a "punishment" for criminal justice purposes. Criminal forfeitures must be 
accompanied by the standard due process protections found in criminal cases, such as the 
requirement of "beyond a reasonable doubt" as the burden of proof (Stahl, 1992). Criminal 
forfeitures comprise about 20 percent of all forfeitures (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998). 
 
The second type of forfeiture, civil forfeiture (also called in rem forfeiture), is more common.  Civil 
forfeitures most often take place in the absence of criminal proceedings and with fewer due process 
protections than are found in criminal forfeitures. To engage in civil forfeiture, a law enforcement 
agency need only prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that assets were used in criminal 
activity, and those assets may be seized and subsequently forfeited by a court in a civil proceeding 
 
FORFEITURE CONCERNS 
 
The amount of money expended on the "war on drugs" has increased substantially in the past 
decade. For example, during the last 10 years, the federal government has allocated more than 
$100 billion to the war, and this does not include the amount of money spent by state and local 
governments, which contribute, at a minimum, an equal amount (McNeece, Bullington, Mayfield, 
& Springer, 1999). Despite all this, there has been ample evidence to suggest that the "war on drugs" 
is a failure (Chambliss, 1995; Goode, 1999; Miller & Selva, 1994; Nadelmann, 1988; Zimring & 
Hawkins, 1992). One aspect of the war on drugs, civil asset forfeiture, has drawn both support and 
criticism as a tool for increasing the amount of money that law enforcement agencies can use to 
combat illegal drug use and distribution. In fact, some agencies report that the amount of money 
received from forfeitures is equal to or exceeds operating budgets (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998; 
Hawk, 1993). Even if the war on drugs is considered a failure, it has increased the revenues of most, if 
not all, law enforcement agencies through the use of forfeitures (Benson & Rasmussen, 1998; 
Benson, Rasmussen, & Soliar$, 1995; Miller & Selva, 1994). 
 
Because of the lower standard of proof (compared to a criminal case) and the absence of criminal 
prosecution, civil forfeitures are more desirable to law enforcement agencies (Jensen & Gerber, 1996; 
Stahl, 1992). Supporters claim that civil forfeiture takes the profit out of the drug business and can be 
used as a tool in reducing the supply of drugs and drug-related crime (Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, 2001). It also enhances the relationship between federal and state law enforcement 
agencies. One Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent stated that forfeiture "is not about the 
money. It's about the collaborative effort" (Masters, 2001, p. T3). 
 
Critics argue that the ease of administration entices law enforcement agencies to use forfeiture to 
increase their revenues. Worrall (2001) argues that monetary concerns many times outweigh 
service and crime-control concerns, especially if there are budgetary shortfalls. A sheriff in Loudon 
County, Maryland, supports this by saying that forfeitures "help [us] buy equipment that we probably 
wouldn't get from the budget" (Masters, 2001, p. T3). Miller and Selva (1994) report that, before 
forfeiture, the amount of drugs and the level of threat were the primary determinants of police 
action. Today, however, the amount of money that can be seized is a primary determinant. 
Blumenson and Nilsen (1998) argue that some departments focus on drug buyers rather than 
dealers, because buyers are more likely to have cash on them. As a result, the "reducing supply" 
argument posited by supporters of civil forfeiture is baseless; focusing on buyers may, if anything, 
stem demand, not supply (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998). 
 
To allay some of the concerns about civil asset forfeiture, Congress passed and President Clinton 
signed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 200 I , Title 18 U.S. Code Section 981. This legislation 
provided more protection to individuals subject to federal civil forfeiture proceedings. One of the 
changes was an increased standard of proof needed in order for federal authorities to seize assets. 
Before the act, authorities needed only probable cause to engage in civil forfeitures; the standard 
is now a preponderance of evidence.  In addition, the legislation created a uniform innocent owner 
defense and extended the amount of time in which a person may challenge a forfeiture. Despite all 
this, critics contend that this act does nothing to curb state and local forfeitures and that the standard 
of proof is still too low (Hadaway, 2000). 
 
WHERE EXACTLY DOES THE MONEY GO? 
Both federal and state governments have created laws to outline not only where forfeited money can 
go but also for what purposes the money may be used. Table 1 provides an illustration of these 
guidelines by listing the jurisdictions (states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government) 
that explicitly provide this information. 
 
In the federal system, civil forfeitures are carried out under Section 881 of the Comprehensive Drug 
 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act (Title 21, U.S. Code Section 881). Originally created in 1970, 
this act allowed the federal government to seize and forfeit a number of materials used in the illegal 
drug trade, and states have followed suit (Stahl, 1992). In 1984, the act was amended to allow 
proceeds from civil forfeitures to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury's General Fund. This 
amendment was changed in 1986, when the government allowed federal law enforcement 
agencies to keep proceeds related to the forfeiture. It also established "equitable sharing," which gives 
state and local agencies most of the proceeds of forfeitures (up to 80 percent) if they were involved 
in the action (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998). "Equitable sharing" allows states to receive proceeds that 
go far beyond what they would normally receive if they conducted their own forfeitures, because the 
federal government engages in more profitable forfeitures (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998). In fiscal 2001, 
the U.S. Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Fund Program reported approximately $400 million 
(Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001). The Bureau of Justice Statistics (2000) reported that 
local law enforcement agencies received around $650 million in 1997. Individual state totals are 
difficult to ascertain, because not all revenues from forfeitures are reported. For example, the 
state of Oregon reported receipts of about $2 million from forfeitures in 2000, but not all forfeitures 
were reported ("Report Details Property Forfeiture Law,"2001). 
 
 
A glance at Table I indicates that states, if they choose, could receive substantial revenues not only 
from federal forfeitures but also from their own. (See the Appendix for the statutes of each state.) 
If state law enforcement agencies alone engaged in forfeitures, most would receive some of the 
proceeds. Most jurisdictions have multiple outlets for proceeds of forfeitures (and are therefore 
represented in multiple columns in Table l ). Some jurisdictions articulate specific guidelines for 
disposition of funds. For example, Illinois law states that 65 percent of proceeds are to go to law 
enforcement agencies and 12.5 percent are to go to the state attorney. In contrast, Florida does not 
specify how much is to go to various agencies. Most jurisdictions allow for property to be kept for 
official use (79 percent). An even higher number of jurisdictions (83 percent) allow for proceeds from 
forfeitures to be used to pay forfeiture expenses. Almost 9 out of 10 jurisdictions (88 percent) 
specify that funds from forfeitures are to be given to law enforcement agencies (including prosecuting 
agencies) or are to be used for law enforcement purposes. Blumenson and Nilsen (1998) argue 
that allocation of forfeited funds to law enforcement operations compromises crime prevention and 
due process. They also point out that revenues reach beyond police; courts receive funds, and judicial 
independence is called into question when a guilty finding rendered by a judge may directly 
increase the judge's budget. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 also gives an indication of forfeiture proceeds that may go toward other, non-law 
enforcement purposes. Nine jurisdictions (17percent) specify that at least some portion 
of forfeiture proceeds are to go to any of the following: schools, health departments, 
and nonprofit organizations. Another 29 percent (15 of 52 jurisdictions) specify that 
proceeds may be used for drug treatment or education. Of these, only 9 jurisdictions 
explicitly allow proceeds to be used for drug treatment. In total, this encompasses 
fewer than 20 percent of all states that specifically mention drug treatment. Some 
states allow proceeds to be deposited into the general fund, and this money could be 
used for treatment programs. Nevertheless, most states do not explicitly allow forfeited 
proceeds to be used for treatment. This is telling, because it has been argued that 
treatment appears to be more effective in reducing drug abuse and drug-related 
crime (Goode, 1999; McNeece et al., 1999). Thus, if one of the purposes of forfeiture is 
to reduce drug- related crime, it appears that most proceeds from forfeiture are not being 
used for that goal. 
 
In addition, Jaw enforcement agencies may benefit from forfeiture even though state law forbids 
it (Boyd & Hill, 1999). In Missouri, for example, the constitution states that proceeds from state 
forfeitures are to be used for school purposes only. Until recently, Missouri law enforcement 
found away around this policy. Missouri law enforcement would investigate but would allow the 
federal DEA to carry out the seizure of property, and the federal courts would authorize the 
forfeiture. Because of “equitable sharing," Missouri law enforcement received up to 80 percent 
of the proceeds of these forfeitures; because Missouri officials did not seize the property and 
the state courts did not authorize forfeiture, the proceeds were not used "for school purposes 
only." According to Boyd and Hitt (1999), since 1993, Missouri has earned approximately 
$41 million from forfeitures (state and federal), and only $12 million has gone to schools. In May 
2001, Missouri's governor signed into law a bill that closed this loophole. It took effect on 
August 28, 2001 ("Holden Signs Drug Forfeiture Bill,"2001). 
 
In addition to the new legislation in Missouri, voters in Oregon and Utah, two states that have 
seen tremendous benefits from forfeitures, have passed initiatives that are hoped will curb 
forfeitures by law enforcement agencies (Mann, 2000). Other states, however, have called for  
amending laws to give agencies a larger share of proceeds. In Mississippi, the State Bureau of 
Narcotics wants to amend the state law that gives only 20 percent of forfeiture proceeds to local 
agencies. The Bureau feels that these local agencies should receive most of the proceeds 
because it would encourage state and local agencies to work together to generate more 
cases and larger proceeds. Local agencies need more funding; thus, larger proceeds would be 
helpful ("Mississippi Narcotics Agency," 2000). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research note has examined how states and the federal government dispose of funds 
received from civil forfeitures. Although state and federal laws vary in terms of what 
proceeds can be returned to agencies, it is apparent that law enforcement agencies are 
receiving tremendous benefits from civil forfeiture. Worrall (2001) goes so far as to say that 
agencies are "addicted" to the revenues received from forfeitures because of the many uses of 
revenues in their work. The state and federal laws illustrated above allow law enforcement 
much leeway in the use of forfeited funds, and, coupled with the lowered due process 
 
protections in civil forfeitures, it is no surprise that law enforcement agencies engage in 
this practice. On the surface, the "war on drugs" speaks of a reduction in or elimination of drug 
use and abuse. Drug use was on the decline, however, when the "war on drugs" began, and 
since that time the "war'' has not contributed significantly to a decline in drug use. In fact, drug 
use has remained stable or has declined for most drugs (excluding heroin) (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2000). Thus, there must be some reason besides inertia for the continuation of an 
unsuccessful war. One justification could lie in the success of civil forfeiture, allowing 
supplements to law enforcement revenues in the midst of inadequate budgets and 
contributing to "collaborative efforts" between federal and state agencies. Where would 
these budgets and "collaborative efforts" be if civil forfeiture were eliminated? This could 
explain why the "war on drugs" has continued for so many years despite ample evidence 
that it is a failure. 
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